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I. Abstract
Although constitutional takings clauses have been the topic of
substantial scholarship, the current literature lacks a methodological
framework for understanding and analyzing takings clauses. Because
there are so few cases of constitutional takings clauses to compare,
applying "large n" quantitative methods to takings clauses would be
difficult. Therefore, legal scholars need to use "small n" qualitative
research methods.
Typologies can provide a framework for meaningful qualitative
analysis. In the social sciences, typologies have been used to
differentiate among different types of political regimes,' electoral
* J.D. University of California, Hastings College of the Law 2007. The author would
like to express his sincere appreciation to Radhika Rao as well as Ben and Betty Wiles,
who recently celebrated their 50' wedding anniversary and have been a source of constant
inspiration and support.
1. See Juan J. Linz, An Authoritarian Regime: Spain, in CLEAVAGES, IDEOLOGIES
AND PARTY SYSTEMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY (Erik
Allardt and Yrjo Littunen, eds., 1964); Juan J. Linz, Totalitarianism and Authoritarian
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shifts,2 and economic growth strategies.3 These typologies can then be
used to frame research questions, develop theories, and test
hypotheses.
This Note proposes a typology that classifies takings clauses
based on the political motivations of the takings clause's framers.
Political motivation is a useful benchmark because it can affect both
the scope of protected property rights and the degree to which the
rights are enforced. I will use the Constitutions of South Africa,
Germany, and the United States as touchstones for a typology of
constitutional takings clauses, representing practical, reactionary, and
philosophical takings clauses respectively.
II. General Typology Features
Generally speaking, a typology (or classification) of the objects
in a given domain D is created by creating a list of criteria such that
every element of D satisfies exactly one of those criteria A typology
must be designed with a distinct domain in mind. In this case, my
typology covers constitutional takings clauses. For the purposes of
the paper, I will use "constitutional" to mean "textually retrenched in
a constitution. '' 6 There is also often a blurred line between takings
clauses and property rights in general. Some constitutions protect
property in ways other than demanding compensation for
government expropriation of property.' These protections may be in
addition to a takings clause or instead of one. Without foreclosing
Regimes, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, VOLUME 3: MACROPOLITICAL
THEORY (Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., 1975).
2. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND
REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1973).
3. See CHARLES BOIX, POLITICAL PARTIES, GROWTH AND EQUITY:
CONSERVATIVE AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC ELECTORAL STRATEGIES IN THE WORLD
ECONOMY (1998).
4. See JUAN L. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST
EUROPE 55-64 (1996) (theorizing that regime type influences the probability and nature of
regime change).
5. CARL G. HEMPEL, FUNDAMENTALS OF CONCEPT FORMATION IN EMPIRICAL
SCIENCE 703 (1970).
6. The constitutional retrenchment of a right is often a question of degree: some
constitutionally protected property rights are more easily "reached" and altered by non-
constitutional legislative and executive forces. However, the purpose of this paper is not
to delve into what "constitutional" means, or when the retrenchment of a right rises to a
"constitutional" level.
7. Through a due process clause, for example.
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the possibility that my typology could also be useful for classifying
other types of property protection, the domain that my typology
covers includes only constitutional takings clauses.
Typologies are generally constructed according to two virtues:
exclusiveness and exhaustiveness.8 A typology is exclusive if it sets
forth criteria such that each element in the domain only fits one of the
criteria in the typology.9 A typology is exhaustive if each element in
the domain fits at least one of the criteria of the typology.1" A good
typology is both exclusive and exhaustive: each element in the
domain should fit one and only one of the typology's criteria. I have
tried to create a typology that is both exclusive and exhaustive.
In addition, a distinction is often made between artificial and
natural classifications. 1 Natural classifications are based on essential
characteristics of the items under investigation, while artificial
classifications are groupings determined by superficial criteria or
external criteria.12 Natural classifications are more useful, as they are
often closely related to other logically independent characteristics.13 I
have attempted to create a natural typology by distilling the historical
and political influences that engender a constitutional takings clause
down to their essential character.
HI. The P/R/P Takings Typology
The criteria that constitute my typology are practical,
reactionary, and philosophical takings clause motivations. These
criteria constitute a practical/reactionary/philosophical or P/R/P
typology.
A practical takings clause results from a short-term political
bargain. It may result when a political actor has property that it
wants protected, or wants to expropriate particular property. While
all constitutional negotiations lead to confrontations, the "practical"
takings clause is distinguished on the basis of the short-term, concrete
interests that actors attempt to protect or expropriate.
A reactionary takings clause is a response to an egregious past
property expropriations or egregious past property protections.
8. HEMPEL, supra note 1, at 703.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 704.
12. Id. at 705.
13. Id.
Summer 20071 CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING CLAUSES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
While the practical takings clause may be thought of as a short-term
takings clause, a reactionary takings clause is a middle-term takings
clause. There may be some time buffer between the end of the
previous constitution and the new constitution. However, the time
buffer is not so long as to cool the passions that were inflamed by the
prior expropriations or protections. A reactionary response to
egregious expropriations or protections is unlikely to motivate for a
full-scale constitutional reformulation of the structure of government,
and therefore may partially located within a larger long-term
constitutional theory. However, this greater constitutional theory
only provides the basis or foundation for the possibility of a
reactionary takings clause.
A philosophical takings motivation is wholly part of a larger
long-term constitutional theory. Philosophical thinkers and writers
have a direct, substantial impact on the framers of a philosophical
takings clause. It is impossible to "place" the property protection
within a middle-term reactionary motivation or a short-term practical
motivation. There is likely a time buffer between the end of the
previous constitution and the new constitution and a cooling of
revolutionary passions. The framers of a philosophical takings clause
may consider themselves in terms of a longer expanse of history as
opposed to their place within short-term revolutionary spirit.
IV. The Practical Takings Clause: Section 28 of
South Africa's Interim Constitution
Section 28 of South Africa's Interim Constitution was a
"practical" takings clause. Section 28 of the Interim Constitution was
not the result of a theoretical or socio-cultural impetus, but rather a
short-term political bargain.' The negotiated transition to democracy
in South Africa required a number of compromises between the
parties to the first phase of constitution making, primarily the
National Party (NP) and the African National Congress (ANC). 5
The concrete, short-term interests that clashed, as well as the
compromises that this clash necessitated, make the takings clause
contained in Article 28 of the Interim Constitution of South Africa a
''practical" takings clause.
14. Peter N. Levenberg, South Africa's New Constitution: Will It Last?, 29 INT'L LAW
633,640 (1995
15. David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25 LAW &
SOC. Inquiry 757, 765 (Summer 2000).
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The Interim Constitution was the first step towards the ultimate
relinquishment of white minority power in South Africa. 6  The
Interim Constitution was drafted through a multi-party negotiating
process, in which various parties, including the NP and the ANC,
submitted proposals for the basic framework of the Interim
Constitution.7 The Technical Committee and Ad Hoc Committees
facilitated this process. 8 The Technical Committee served as the
initial forum for proposals. 9 If the parties could not come to an
agreement in the Technical Committee, issues could be referred to an
Ad Hoc Committee for further negotiations and debate."
It is difficult to reconcile the ANC's "populist socialist
ideology"'" with the concern of South African whites for private
property protections. This issue was, and still is, a powerful shaping
force in South African constitutional politics. 2 Levenberg writes,
"given the players in the constitutional drama and the events that
preceded it, it is not surprising that a primary tension in the
Constitution was between concern on the part of the haves to protect
their property rights and the populist socialist ideology of the ANC."'
Protection of property rights was a hotly contested issue at the
multiparty negotiations leading to the adoption of South Africa's
interim Constitution.24 It was ultimately the last issue decided: after
consensus was reached on the rest of the interim Bill of Rights, the
parties remained unable to agree on an interim property right.2 It
was only in the last days before the deadline, and after the
establishment of an ad-hoc technical committee to formulate
16. See DION A. BASSON, SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERIM CONSTITUTION: TEXT AND
NOTES 96-106 (1994); MATTHEW CHASKALSON & RICHARD SPITZ, THE POLITICS OF
TRANSITION: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA'S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT
322-25 (2000); In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(4) S.A.
774 (S. Aft.).





21. Levenberg, supra note 14.
22 Jennifer Frankel, The Legal and Regulatory Climate for Investment in Post-
Apartheid South Africa: An Historical Overview, 6 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 183, 200
(Spring 1998).
23. Levenberg, supra note 14.
24. F.G.T. Radloff, Land Registration and Land Reform in South Africa, 29 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 809, 821-22 (Spring 1996).
25. Id.
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proposals, that the negotiating forum ratified § 28 of the Interim
Constitution.26
The NP and its supporters argued strongly for the inclusion of
such a clause to ensure land would not be nationalized and
transferred to the land-hungry majority without compensation to
current owners.27 The NP was intent on ensuring that the property of
existing white owners would be safe from the depredations of a future
democratic government.8 The ANC, on the other hand, was anxious
that a constitutional right to property should not impede legislative
programs addressing the massive disparities of wealth in society
which were the legacy of apartheid.29 In addition, within the ANC a
land lobby was particularly concerned about the implications of a
constitutional property right for a program of land restitution to assist
the victims of force removals." Within the ANC it was argued that
"to entrench existing property rights in the new South African
Constitution was to legitimize and entrench, as a human right, the
consequences of generations of apartheid and dispossession.""
These conflicting concerns were expressed starkly in the parties'
respective policy documents on a Bill of Rights. Clause 18 of the
NP's Proposals on a Charter on Human Rights contained four major
provisions: 1) each person has the right to property, 2) no person shall
be deprived of property other than under a judgment or order of a
court of law, 3) property may be expropriated for public purposes
upon agreed compensation or cash market value, and 4) persons shall
not be subjected to expropriatory taxes.32 Chaskalson notes that it is
difficult to think of any constitutional instrument which elevates the
rights of property owners to a level which clause 18 of the NP's
proposal would have done.33  In contrast, the ANC sought to
subordinate the rights of property owners to the needs of the general
public.' 4  In particular, the ANC's proposal provided for just,
"equitable" compensation and required that compensation "not
26. Id.
27. Sam Rugege, Land Reform in South Africa: An Overview, 32 INT'L J. LEGAL
INFO. 283, 287-88 (Summer 2004).
28. CHASKALSON, supra note 16, at 322.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Rugege, supra note 27.
32. CHASKALSON, supra note 16.




imped[e] legislation such as might be deemed necessary., 35 It also
provided for a tribunal for land claims for dispossessed blacks.36
Despite including a takings clause in its initial proposal, the ANC
argued that a property protection clause should not be included in the
Interim Constitution at all.37
While the ANC objected in vain to the inclusion of a property
clause and other unnecessary rights in the interim Bill of rights, the
NP concentrated on shaping the wording of the relevant clauses.38 In
the initial confusion around the role of the Technical Committee the
NP were able to dictate the terms of the original debate over the
wording of the property clause while the ANC contended that the
Technical Committee had exceeded its mandate. By forestalling the
prospects of a democratically elected constitutional assembly until the
second phase of constitution making, the NP was able to insist on the
protection of "rights in property.,
39
When the ANC finally accepted that it had to engage with the
particulars of the property clause, it found that the debate around
property had been cast as a debate over how much protection from a
democratic state would be given to existing title holders."0 Once the
ANC realized that the Bill of Rights would contain a clause
protecting existing property rights, it identified two main objectives:
securing land reform and land restitution, and the ability to regulate
for the common good."
The final result was a takings clause that enshrined the concept
of compensation for expropriation, while allowing courts flexibility in
determining "equitable" levels of compensation. The final result also
allowed distinguished between "expropriation," which requires
compensation, and "deprivation," which requires none. Section 8 of
the Interim Constitution reads:
(1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights
in property, and, to the extent that the nature of the rights
permit, to dispose of such rights.
(2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted
otherwise than in accordance with a law.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 324.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Schneiderman, supra note 15.
40. CHASKALSON, supra note 16, at 324.
41. Id.
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(3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a
law referred to in subsection (2), such expropriation shall be
permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the
payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the
payment of such compensation and within such period as may
be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking
into account all relevant factors, including, in the case of the
determination of compensation, the use to which the property is
being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the
value of the investments in it by those affected and the interests
of those affected.42
The short term concrete interests that the NP sought to protect
(and that the ANC sought to expropriate) played the dominant role
in shaping Section 8 of South Africa's Interim Constitution. The NP's
short-term interests resulted in placing property protections on the
negotiation table, while the ANC made the compromise of allowing
the takings clause, while limiting its application to general regulation
and the requirement of market value compensation. As a short-term
political bargain, section 8 is an example of the "practical" takings
clause criteria of the P/R/P typology.
V. The Reactionary Takings Clause:
The 14th Basic Law of the German Constitution
The 14th Basic Law of the German Constitution is an example of
a "reactionary" takings clause. The entrenchment of the Basic Law
of post-World War II Germany was a response to the disregard the
Nazis had shown for human rights during the period of the Third
Reich. In order to understand the German Basic Law, it is necessary
to understand the attempts to protect property in earlier German
Constitutions. This is because the Basic Law was a response to the
failings of these previous attempts.
Constitutional protection of property dates back to Germany's
failed 1848 Revolution. Indeed, among the motives of that abortive
uprising was a desire on the part of the German people to secure
individual freedoms, including the right to free speech, equality
before the law, and private property. Article 164 of the 1849
Constitution states: "Property is inviolable. Expropriation of
property may take place only if necessary for the common weal, only
42. S. Afr. Interim Const. § 28.
[Vol. 34.4
CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING CLAUSES
on a legal basis and against fair compensation." 3 These provisions
demonstrate that the notion that the state must have only limited
power to deprive its citizens of their property runs deep in the
German constitutional tradition."
The Reich Constitution of 1871, however, did not protect the
right to property.45 Hucko writes that the "Romantic Age of
Revolutions had come to an end" and that pragmatism, not idealism,
was the order of the day.46 Moreover, at the time of the formal
founding of the German Empire in 1871, the power to interfere with
the exercise of the basic rights enumerated in the Constitution of 1849
was left to individual German states; protection against such
interference would therefore logically come from state constitutions.47
The protection of basic rights in the Reich Constitution "might have
been interpreted as an attack on the autonomy of individual states."48
The Weimar Constitution of 1919 reinstated constitutional
protection of property. Article 153 of the Weimar Constitution
states:
Property is guaranteed by the Constitution. Its extent and the
restrictions placed upon it are defined by law. Expropriation
may be effected only for the benefits of the general community
and upon basis of law. It shall be accompanied by due
compensation, save in so far as may be otherwise provided by a
law of the Reich. The ownership of property entails
obligations. Its use must at the same time serve the common
good.49
In addition, Article 155 clarified the permissible purposes of
expropriation, stating that that "landed property may be expropriated
when required to meet the needs of housing, or for the purpose of
land settlement, the bringing of land into cultivation or the
improvement of husbandry."5 The Weimar constitutional protections
of private property were primarily driven by a desire to construct
43. Deutsche Verfassung vom 1849 (Constitution), Art. 164.
44. Jessica Heslop & Joel Roberto, Property Rights in the Unified Germany: A
Constitutional, Comparative, and International Legal Analysis, 11 B.U. INTLL L.J. 243, 245
(1993).





49. Weimar Verfassung corn 1919 (Constitution), Art. 153.
50. Id. at Art. 155.
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legal obstacles to left-wing attempts at revolutionary reordering of
property rights."
Although compensation for expropriation was textually
enshrined, Weimar era protection of property rights was qualified in
many important respects. While in theory compensation was
required for all takings, Reich legislation passed by a 2/3 vote could
excuse the government from the duty of paying due compensation-
and presumably from paying any compensation-for property
expropriated from private landowners. 2 The Weimar Constitution of
1919 provided for legislative discretion to declare some takings non-
compensable, provided the expropriation serves the common good.
Protection for private property in the Weimar era may, therefore, be
viewed as somewhat limited. Hucko writes that the "Weimar
Constitution betrays a kind of 'value relativism' in that no right
acknowledged therein was considered so fundamental to political
society as to be immutable. Property rights, like all other individual
rights, could be abolished by simple vote of the Parliament.
5 3
It should be noted that although there were some cases were the
2/3 override vote by the Reichstag was attempted, it was never
accomplished. The most notable cases regarded the discontinuance
of payments to royalty that were deemed expropriation. Legislative
measures to overrule the court's rulings were mobilized, but were
unable to meet the 2/3 majority needed to overrule the court's
constitutional conclusion. 4  However, the fact that constitutional
protections could be reached by the Reichstag perhaps provided the
necessary backdrop for the Reichsgericht's (the Weimar Supreme
Court) most damaging failure: non-review of presidential emergency
decrees.
While the Reichgericht had struggled to limit local and Lander
authorities and the caprice of the parliamentary majority, it chose not
to review the content of presidential emergency decrees. It declared
that the president was only bound by Article 48, paragraph 2, the
constitutional article providing for presidential emergency decrees.55
The Reichsgericht essentially granted the president the power to
51. HUCKO, supra note 45, at 59.
52. Heslop, supra note 44, at 247.
53. HUCKO, supra note 45, at 60.
54. PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CRISIS OF GERMAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF WEIMAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM 158-59 (1997).
55. Id. at 160.
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suspend basic rights at will. Caldwell writes, "The contrast between
the court's distrust of the democratic legislature and its faith in the
president could not have been more apparent. 56 This provided the
constitutional underpinnings for Hitler's emergency decrees of 1933
that created the Nazi dictatorship and, along with the Reichstag fire,
essentially destroyed the Weimar government.
As the Nazi consolidated their power, Nazi ideology provided
the basis for judicial scholarship. The resulting scholarship provided
a philosophical cloak for the Nazi's arbitrary acts and crimes, as well
as the basis for judicial decisions. 7 Miller writes, "legal scholars
began to indulge in polemics against human rights, guarantees of
individual rights vis-A-vis the state, limitations of state powers, and
the restraints upon the state to impose punishments."58 Nazi ideology
permeated the judiciary, and approved the basic violations
perpetrated by Hitler's regime.
Jews were a primary target of the Nazi regime's authoritarian
excess. Through a myriad of special legal provisions applicable
largely only to Jews, the Nazi dictatorship exerted constant and
continually increasing pressure at all levels to drive Jews from their
property and from the economy as a whole. 9 Legal limits on Jews'
economic and political freedom took many forms and were designed
to drive them gradually from the mainstream of the German
economy.6° As time went on, however, the laws limiting the scope
and exercise of economic and commercial rights were supplanted with
laws authorizing the wholesale confiscation or forced sale of Jewish-
owned property, whether real or personal.61 In the years preceding
the pogrom against the Jews initiated on November 9, 1938, the Nazis
made concerted efforts to drive the Jews from Germany's economic
life.
62
The first legal basis for the outright expropriation of property by
the Nazis was the Law Concerning the Confiscation of the Property
56. Id.
57. INGO MILLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 68
(1992).
58. Id. at 70.
59. Martin E.Elling, Privatization in Germany: A Model for Legal and Functional
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of Enemies of the People and State enacted in July 1933.63 Although
principally designed to allow the confiscation of property owned by
communist activists, the Nazis also used the law against other
disfavored groups, and against many Jews.6' In 1938 German law
required Jews and their non-Jewish spouses to register the entirety of
their domestic and foreign property.6' Failure to comply was
punishable by large fines or even imprisonment. A series of law were
subsequently passed in quick succession authorizing the forced sale
and confiscation of most Jewish-owned property. Pursuant to the
Decree on the Use of Jewish Property the forced sale and liquidation
of real property, securities, jewelry, and art works was authorized.
66
A succession of ordinances enacted over the following years further
defined and implemented the purpose of this decree.67
Following Germany's defeat in WWII, a new constitution was
drafted which further enshrined individual rights. As Hucko writes,
"no previous rulers in German history had treated human beings with
such contempt, terrorized them so much and slaughtered so many of
them as the Nazis had done. The establishment of a catalogue of
basic rights at the beginning of the Basic Law was therefore a
demonstrative response to this experience." 68  The Parliamentary
Council, charged with drafting the new constitution, was guided in
this by the earlier experience of the Weimar Republic. The
possibility of restricting basic rights through parliamentary legislation
had led to a watering down and undermining of basic rights. As a
result, various safeguard were built into the Basic Law, such as the
ban on individual exemptions from the basic rights, the inviolability
of the catalogue's substance, their directly binding force also on the
legislator, and their irremovability through government emergency
measures.
63. Gesetz uber die Einziehung volks- und staatsfeindlichen Vermogens, 1933 RGBI.
1 479.
64. Elling, supra note 59, at 589.
65. Verordnung ubner die Anmeldung des Vermodens von Juden, 1938 RGBI. 1 414.
66. Verordnung uber den Einsatz des judischen Vermogens, 1938 RGBI. 1 1709
67. Durchfuhrungscerordnung zur Verordnung uber den Einsatz des judischen
Vermogens, 1939 RGBI. I 37; Anordnung aufgrund der Verordnung uber die Anmeldung
des Vermogens von Juden, 1939 RGBI. I 282; Anordnung zur Durchfuhrung der
Verordnung uder den Einsatz des judischen Vermogens, 1941 RGBI. 1 218;
Verfahrensordnung der Reichskammer der Bildenen Kunste als Ankaufstelle fur
Kulturgut, 1941 RGBI. 1 245.
68. HUCKO, supra note 45, at 70.
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The significance of the right to property and the principles
governing its interpretation of Article 14 were set forth in the seminal
German takings case, the Hamburg Flood Control Case.69 In that
case, the Reichsgericht acknowledged that property protection under
the Basic Law went much further than under the Weimar
Constitution.7' In particular, the Reichsgericht emphasized that the
Basic Law not only protects the market value of property, but also
secures existing property in the hands of its owners.7 The court
stated that property is not merely a material interest, but also a
personal one:
Because the Weimar Constitution had no provisions for testing
the constitutionality of expropriation laws, and because judicial
review was [severely] restricted, the judiciary had to be
concerned primarily with protecting property owners through
compensation . . . By contrast, as already pointed out, the
property guarantee under Article 14[I][2] must be seen in
relationship to the personhood of the owner-i.e., to the
realm of freedom within which persons engage in self-
defining, responsible activity. The property right is not
primarily a material but rather a personal guarantee.
Constitutional protection of property rights in the German Basic
Law was a response to the failures of the Weimar Constitution and
the abuse perpetrated by the Nazi regime. German courts'
interpretation of the German takings clause reflects the Basic Law's
status as first and foremost a response to the violations of
"personhood" under the Nazi regime. The German Basic Law, as a
reaction to the failures of Weimar property protection as well as Nazi
abuses, serves as an example of a reactionary takings clause.
VI. The Philosophical Takings Clause: The Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution is an
example of a "philosophical" takings clause. Its inception was not the
result of either a reaction to egregious past expropriations/protections
or a short-term political bargain. Rather, the framers of the United
States Constitution, particularly James Madison, were directly and




Summer 20071 CONSTITUTIONAL TAKING CLAUSES
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
substantially influenced by political philosophers and thinkers. The
takings clause in the United States was the product of a convergence
of classical liberal and classical republican theory.
Liberal and republican ideologies resonated with the Founders,
especially Madison, the author of the Bill of Rights. These ideologies
converged at the Constitutional Convention, and the Takings Clause
of the Fifth Amendment is one example of this convergence.
Property protections, within both the liberal and republican
paradigms, were originally popular as polemics against the abuses of
the British Crown. The time "buffer" between the conclusion of the
War of Independence and Madison's takings clause allowed
revolutionary passions to cool. As a result, the more strident
property protections that might have been demanded immediately
after Independence were subordinated to Madison's desire to marry
revolutionary ideals with long-term economic prosperity.73 Madison's
takings clause was the result of his philosophical, long-term view.
Classic liberal theory influenced the Founders greatly, in
particular Locke's theory of property rights in the Two Treatises.
The Two Treatises were an effective radical Whig political argument
against the Tories and the power of the British Crown during the
1680s and 1690s.74 It was Locke-in opposition to the abuses of the
Crown and in defense of the principles of limited government, the
natural rights of men, and the right to revolution-that Madison read,
and it was in this context that the early American conceptions of
property were situated.75 Property was a general political term
referring to all the personal and political rights of individuals with
ownership of one's body and talents premised upon the natural
freedom of individuals.76  Thus, when Locke argued that the
protection of property is the end or goal of government, or that each
individual should have property, he was arguing that the social
contract functions to protect the political liberties of individuals.77
Many colonial American readings of Locke's theory of property
73. Had the Bill of Rights been part of the Articles of Confederation, the Takings
Clause may have had a more reactionary flavor.
74. See RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE'S TWO
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 181-228 (1986); David Fellman, The European Background
of Early American Ideas Concerning Property, 14 TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY 503 (1940).
75. DAVID A. SCHULTZ, PROPERTY, POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 15
(1992).
76. ASHCRAFT, supra note 62, at180-83
77. SCHULTZ, supra note 63, at 16.
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noted this connection between personal political liberty and property
ownership, and agreed with Locke that property deserves nearly
absolute protection."8
Classic republicanism's tenets also gained political traction in the
colonies based on their applicability to the revolutionary cause.
Harrington's followers interpreted his doctrine of balance as an
argument against executive patronage and power. This argument
became an important ideological tool of opposition for the American
colonials against King George Ill.79 Harrington's views also surfaced
in James Madison's Federalist #10, in which property distributions
were described as the chief cause of faction in society.' However,
Madison believed that inequalities in property, as rooted in the
differences in human talents and faculties, could be rendered
politically unimportant if the appropriate checks neutralize property
interests' negative effects.8
Madison may have been most influenced, not by Locke or
Harrington, but instead by Blackstone. In the years immediately
preceding the drafting of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, Blackstone's views "split the difference" between
classic liberalism and republicanism. In Volume I of the
Commentaries, property is also described as an absolute right of
Englishmen,82 yet this right is a positive right, created and tempered
by "the laws of the land" and subject to numerous legal restrictions as
described in Volume II. Additionally, though in Commentaries II: 2
Blackstone described property ownership as an absolute dominion,83
he also stated that legal ownership has no foundation in nature or
natural law and that rules prescribing its use and transfer must be
determined by society. Frederick Whelen suggests that Blackstone
was not inconsistent when it came to his discussion of property: for
the jurist property rights were absolute, but only within the lines
78. See G.E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of 'Property' in Seventeenth-
Century England, PAST AND PRESENT 87 (February 1980); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE
UNVARNISHED DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
27-30 (1990).
79. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 144 (1977).
80. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST 56 (New York: Modern Library,
1937); see also Fellman, supra note 74, at 509-16.
81. SCHULTZ, supra note 75, at 18.
82. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. I 12
(1976).
83. Id. at 134.
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prescribed by civil society and law.84 Moreover, though first
occupation may be the original reason that one had acquired use of
property, continued or legal occupation rests upon rules of civil
society. In short, one's absolute rights to property are tempered by
the rights of others or by the public good.85
Blackstone's biographers claim that his influence was greater in
America than in England and that numerous editions of the
Commentaries were shipped to or printed in America.' For example,
sixteen of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, including
Madison, were known to have purchased and read the
Commentaries.87 At the Constitutional Convention the founders
discussed terms such as "ex post facto laws" and "due process" in the
sense that Blackstone had described these legal concepts.8 But most
important, some argue that it was Blackstone's influence that was
especially important in early American legal history because judges
and lawyers (in addition to many of the founders, such as Jefferson,
Hamilton, and Adams) turned to him for reference as they sought to
apply English property law to new American social and economic
conditions.89
Madison envisioned a market economy and valued it for its
freedom as well as the prosperity and national strength they thought
it would bring. In contrast to Jefferson, Madison understood that a
market economy is not an absence off a social order, but rather a
particular type of social order. Madison wanted a government that
would protect the foundation of that order: the freedom and security
to acquire and exchange property. As Madison saw it, the role of the
constitution was to ensure the foundation of a market-republic-with
the freedom, justice, prosperity, and strength he thought it promised.9
84. Frederick Whelan, Property as Artifice: Hume and Blackstone, in NOMOS XXII:
PROPERTY, 119-20 (J.R. Pennock & J.W. Chapman, eds., 1980),
85. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. II
374 (1976).
86. See DAVID LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 169-70 (1938); see also
LEWIS C. WARDEN, THE LIFE OF BLACKSTONE 320-21 (1938).
87. WARDEN, supra note 86, at 323.
88. LOCKMILLER, supra note 86, at 174.
89. See Harry Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY 360 (Donald
Fleming & B. Bailys eds., 1971); see also Morton Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 11 (1977).
90. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN




Appleby writes that Jefferson saw the economy as "an escape from
politics."91 Madison viewed the creation of the market-republic not as
an escape from politics, but as a marriage of politics and prosperity.
Thus the takings clause that was enshrined in the Fifth Amendment is
most properly viewed as a long-term, philosophical takings clause.
VII. Additional Observations
The greatest flaw of the P/R/P typology is that it may not be
perfectly exclusive. Reasonable minds could differ as to whether
there is an important reactionary component in the South African
Interim Constitution, as the ANC was interested in remedying past
land dispossession. It could also be argued that the German Basic
Law has a philosophical component, as constitutional protection of
property had a lengthy history before it was enshrined in the Basic
Law. However, regardless of these arguments, each constitutional
creation, and each entrenchment of property rights, has a distinct
character. Conflicting and complementing motivations may "seep in"
to that character, but that does not change the essential character
itself. The exclusivity problem is widespread in the social sciences
and I have done my best to minimize it.
One way to further refine the P/R/P typology would be to more
explicitly enumerate the hallmarks of each criterion. One way I have
attempted to do this is with a temporal dimension: a practical takings
clause has a short-term motivation, a reactionary takings clause has a
middle-term motivation, and a philosophical takings clause has a
long-term motivation. The P/R/P criteria may also be differentiated
by the time buffer between a revolution and the constitutional
drafting. Additional insights into markers of motivations that are
characteristically "practical," "reactionary," and "philosophical" will
further refine the P/R/P typology.
VIII. Further Questions
The P/R/P typology may be useful for further analysis of takings
clauses. In particular, it allows us to better formulate answers to
important takings clause questions. Is there a predominant reason
why property rights become entrenched in constitutions? The P/R/P
typology would allow for a wide-ranging assessment of all
91. JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN
VISION OF THE 1790S 37 (1984).
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constitutional takings clauses. Perhaps a majority of takings clauses
happen to fit one of the P/R/P criteria. What would that tell us about
the nature of takings clauses themselves? Another important
question is how property rights are enforced once they become
entrenched. If the initial motivation for the takings clause is practical
or reactionary, will the judiciary lose interest in enforcing the takings
clause once the interests that led to the takings clause's creation have
lost vigor? Or would a philosophical takings clause motivation lead
to dogmatic or extreme results because there are no concrete interests
to focus its application? Another important question is whether a
takings clause may be reinterpreted by the judiciary and move from
one category to another. If there is a particularly egregious property
expropriation in a country, will that expropriation become the
lodestar for all future takings jurisprudence? Could a takings clause
shift from a philosophical or practical motivation to a reactionary
one? This might help answer important questions about the role of
judicial interpretation in general. The P/R/P provides a useful,
concrete analytic tool for the assessment of constitutional takings
clauses.
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